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The Perilous Dialogue 
Laura K. Donohue† 
Five months before his retirement, Justice William Brennan wrote in a 
dissent: “the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to ‘create’ rights.  
Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from 
infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.”1 Professor Stephen 
Holmes reminds us in his lecture that such rights and liberties do not impede 
progress: they embody it.2 The rules preserving rights and liberties can help to 
focus action by bringing clarity to the present, while still preserving a long-
term political perspective. Yet, time and again, both these rights and the rules 
designed to protect them are sacrificed in the name of national security. 
The master metaphor in each sacrifice is, indeed, “security or freedom,” 
and it is on this metaphor that I would like to focus. It dominates the 
counterterrorist discourse both in the United States and abroad.3 Transcripts 
from debates in Ireland’s Dáil Éireann, Turkey’s Büyük Millet Meclisi, and 
Australia’s Parliament are filled with reference to the need to weigh the value 
of liberty against the threat posed by terrorism. Perhaps nowhere is this more 
pronounced than in the United Kingdom, where, for decades, counterterrorist 
debates have turned on this framing.4 However, owing in part to different 
 
Copyright © 2009 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
† Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, Stanford Law School. Special thanks to the Brennan 
Institute for their invitation to participate in the series, to Stephen Holmes and Paul Schwartz for 
their comments at the lecture, and to Aaron Gershbock at the California Law Review for his 
excellent editorial assistance. This article draws in large measure from Laura K. Donohue, The 
Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty (2008), which provides a detailed 
discussion of the history of counterterrorist law in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
2. Steven Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on 
Terror, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 301 (2009).  
3. See id. at 312-13. 
4. See, e.g., Ian Paisley, 940 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1977) 1737; William Whitelaw, 1 
Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1981) 341; Prime Minister’s interview with CNN, We are at War with 
Terrorism, Sept. 16, 2001, available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1599; Lord Goldsmith, 
Speech to the Royal Services Institute, May 10, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4760031.stm. See generally Laura K. Donohue, 
Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000 
(2007). 
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constitutional structures, what “security or freedom” means in America differs 
from what it means in Britain. 
In the United States, we tend to treat “security” and “freedom” as distinct 
phenomena: policy considerations set against pre-existing, political rights.5 
Security becomes linked to decisions taken by the executive to preserve life—
for example, heightening protection against terrorist attacks by restricting 
entitlements specified in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Judge Richard Posner argues 
that in dangerous times, we must adjust constitutional rights to meet the 
demands of security.6 Professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner propose “a 
basic tradeoff between security and liberty.”7 As Professor Holmes points out, 
the tradeoff framework is not limited to those who come down more heavily on 
the security side of the equation; civil libertarians also refer to the framework, 
arguing for the protection of rights in the face of security demands.8 
In the United Kingdom, in contrast, scholars and policy makers tend to 
consider security versus freedom as a case of competing rights: the right to life 
or the right to freedom from fear set against the right to move freely. As Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced on 9/11, the exercise of state power would be 
necessary to protect “the basic civil liberty that people have to go about their 
business free form [sic] terror.”9 This framing—competing rights in tension—
reflects Britain’s constitutional structure. Measures introduced by Parliament 
do not have to conform to a written constitution.10 While some documents, such 
as the 1215 Magna Carta, or the 1689 Bill of Rights, carry special significance, 
they are part of a broader system that encompasses legal and non-legal rules.11 
The multiplicity and fluidity of rights, and the constant effort to balance them, 
 
5. Donohue, supra note †, at 4. 
6. See Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of 
National Emergency 9, 31 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, 
in Torture: A Collection 291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
7. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 Va. L. 
Rev. 1091, 1098 (2006). 
8. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 959 (2002) (arguing that the 
balance between civil liberties and security be viewed in a manner that respects “the equal dignity 
and basic human rights of all persons and not succumb to the temptation of purchasing security at 
the expense of noncitizens’ basic rights.”); David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and 
the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 1 
(2002) (highlighting the fundamental tenets of the security versus freedom debate); Mortin 
Halperim, Center for National Security Studies, National Security and Civil 
Liberties: A Benchmark Report, CNSS Report No. 107, at 37 (Feb. 1981) (suggesting that 
balance is required between security and freedom instead of wholesale acceptance of national 
security demands); see also Holmes, supra note 2, at 313 (“So powerful is the imaginative grip of 
this metaphor . . . that even civil libertarians adamantly opposed to extralegal executive discretion 
during emergencies implicitly accept it.”). 
 9. Prime Minister Tony Blair, The War on Terrorism: Prime Minister’s Interview with 
CNN (Sept. 16, 2001), http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1599.asp. 
10. Donohue, supra note †, at 5. 
11. See generally A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (2003). 
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reflect Britain’s relationship with Europe, where the European Convention on 
Human Rights (incorporated into British domestic law through the 1998 
Human Rights Act) and European Communities law weave together to create a 
complex system of rights and rules protecting them.12 
Despite the manner in which the United States and United Kingdom 
interpret “security or freedom,” reflective of their respective constitutional 
differences, in both countries the dichotomy between rights and security 
dominates the counterterrorist discourse. And in both regions, because the 
dichotomy ignores in its narrow terms of reference the far-reaching effects of 
counterterrorism, it stifles the debate.13 As Professor Holmes recognizes, the 
“hydraulic” assumption inherent in the “security or freedom” framework 
overlooks the possibility that rules—indeed, the rule of law itself—provide 
security.14 There are multiple types of securities and liberties at stake. And the 
framework distorts the “real tradeoffs” that are being made, such as the risks 
inevitably entailed in the allocation of limited resources.15 
There are further dangers, but I will concentrate my remarks on how the 
“security or freedom” framework fails to capture the single most important 
characteristic of counterterrorist law: increased executive power that shifts the 
balance of power between the branches of government. At each point where the 
legislature would be expected to push back against the executive’s power—at 
the introduction of measures, at the renewal of temporary provisions, and in the 
exercise of oversight—its ability to do so is limited. The judiciary’s role is 
similarly restricted: constitutional structure and cultural norms narrow the 
courts’ ability to check the executive at anything but the margins. 
With the long-term political and economic effects of this expanded 
executive strength masked by the immediacy of the “security or freedom” 
dichotomy, the true costs of anti-terror legislation in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom have gone uncalculated. Over the past four decades, both 
countries have seen the relationship between governmental branches altered, 
individual rights narrowed, and the relationship of the citizens to the state 
changed. Counterterrorist law has alienated important domestic and 
international communities, created bureaucratic inefficiencies, and interrupted 
commercial activity.16 As these two countries set global counterterrorist norms 
 
12. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ 
19980042.htm. 
13. Donohue, supra note †, at 6. 
14. Holmes, supra note 2, at 316-17 (“[T]he tradeoff thesis implies that whenever liberty is 
curtailed, security is automatically increased.”).  
15. Holmes, supra note 2, at 321 (“[T]he real tradeoffs in the war on terror do not involve a 
sacrifice of liberty for security, but rather a willingness to increase one risk in order to reduce 
another risk. . . . The tradeoffs necessary in the war on terror, as I have been arguing, almost 
always involve this sort of gamble.  The question is: who is right to choose the set of security risks 
that we, as a country, would be better off running?”). 
16. For more detail see Donohue, supra note †. 
DONOHUE FINAL.DOC 4/30/2009  11:11:35 PM 
360 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:357 
through important multilateral and bilateral organizations, such as the United 
Nations (“UN”), the UN Security Council, the G7/G8, and the Financial Action 
Task Force, the risk increases that these detrimental effects will be transferred 
to other constitutional democracies. American and British provisions, 
moreover, have evolved outside the specter of terrorist groups actually using 
weapons of mass destruction to inflict mass casualties. The proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction—and I would add biological weapons to 
Professor Holmes’s concern about fissile material17—together with a growing 
willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, may drive the two 
countries to take increasingly severe measures. Such provisions could lead to a 
shift in the basic constitutional structure of both countries. 
I 
EXPANDING EXECUTIVE POWER 
Counterterrorist law is best described as a spiral, not a pendulum. In this 
spiral, the single most defining feature of counterterrorist law is hypertrophic 
executive power. Two examples readily present themselves. The first, 
antiterrorist finance, centers on stopping the flow of funds to terrorist 
organizations. New initiatives in this area have almost entirely escaped public 
scrutiny.18 The second, surveillance authorities, has attracted more attention. 
Yet almost without exception, consideration has been narrowly cabined to one 
particular program or authority, the result being that the broader picture has not 
been adequately addressed. 
A. Antiterrorist Finance 
In the closing decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, antiterrorist finance initiatives rapidly proliferated.   They 
were closely tied to terrorist attacks. For example, following the Oklahoma 
City bombings, the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act created 
a procedure whereby the Secretary of State could designate groups as Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”).19 The statute made it unlawful to provide 
material support to, or solicit funds on behalf of, the entities so named.20 By 
2001 the number of FTOs placed on the list had grown from thirty to forty-
four.21 Following the 1998 attacks on Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Clinton 
 
17. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 306, 310-11, 314, 321-22, 343, 346. 
18. For a more detailed discussion of antiterrorist finance initiatives and the constitutional 
implications of these measures, see Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to 
the Current Antiterrorist Finance Regime, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 643 (2008). 
19. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 224-2267). 
20. Id. 
21. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2001), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/ 
2001/5258.htm; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
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administration expanded an order, originally issued under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”), that had created a list of 
Specially Designated Terrorists. Following 9/11, the Bush administration 
created a parallel list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists under the 
IEEPA, similarly empowering the executive branch to freeze the assets of 
named suspects. A brief discussion of the evolution of authorities under the 
governing statute will help to illustrate the expansion in executive authority. 
The IEEPA empowered the president to declare a national emergency 
during times of peace “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which 
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”22 The 
statute authorized the commander-in-chief to: 
[I]nvestigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, 
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any 
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.23 
The president may not regulate or prohibit charitable donations related to food, 
clothing, and medicine, “except to the extent that the President determines that 
such donations . . . would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national 
emergency.”24 
During the IEEPA’s first two decades, the president primarily issued 
orders against countries and “nationals thereof,” including Afghanistan,25 
Burma,26 Iran,27 Panama,28 the Russian Federation,29 Sierra Leone,30 Sudan,31 
 
Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2008), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/ 
103392.htm. 
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2004); see also id. § 1702 (listing emergency powers) and 
Donohue, supra note 18, at 647. 
23. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B). 
24. Id. § 1702(b)(2). 
25. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban, Exec. Order No. 
13,129, 3 C.F.R. 200 (2000), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
26. Prohibiting New Investment in Burma, Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998), 
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
27. Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran, Exec. Order No. 13,059, 3 
C.F.R. 217 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Prohibiting Certain Transactions with 
Respect to Iran, Exec. Order No. 12,959, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(Supp. II 1996). 
28. Termination of Emergency with Respect to Panama, Exec. Order No. 12,710, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 13,099 (Apr. 5, 1990). 
29. Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the 
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, Exec. Order No. 
13,159, 3 C.F.R. 277 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
30. Prohibiting the Importation of Rough Diamonds from Sierra Leone, Exec. Order No. 
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and Yugoslavia.32 But in the mid-1990s the emphasis shifted to include terrorist 
organizations. 
In 1995 President Clinton issued an order against Jewish and Palestinian 
groups threatening the Middle East peace process, creating a list of Specially 
Designated Terrorists.33 Three years later, the administration added Usama bin 
Ladin, al Qaeda, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa to the list.34 
Clinton issued a separate order targeting members of the União Nacional para a 
Independencia Total de Angola (“UNITA”).35 In July 1998, building on an 
earlier order under the IEEPA, Clinton applied sanctions to those attempting to 
contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.36 
Less than a fortnight after the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., 
President Bush further expanded executive power under the IEEPA by issuing 
Executive Order (“EO”) 13224, an initiative he declared “draconian.”37 Stating 
the existence of a national emergency, EO 13224 creates a Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists list, blocking “all property and interests in 
property” of those providing material support to terrorism.38 The order lists 
 
13,194, 3 C.F.R. 741 (2002), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); see also Exec. Order No. 
12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1993) (regarding export 
controls); Exec. Order No. 13,464, 73 Fed. Reg. 24,491 (Apr. 30, 2008) (blocking property and 
prohibiting certain transactions). 
31. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan, 
Exec. Order No. 13,067, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
32. Lifting and Modifying Measures with Respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), Exec. Order No. 13,192, 3 C.F.R. 733 (2002), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 
1701 (Supp. I 2001); Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro, 
and Prohibiting Trade Transactions Involving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) in Response to the Situation in Kosovo, Exec. Order No. 13,121, 3 C.F.R. 176 
(2000), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Blocking Property of the Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the 
Republic of Montenegro, and Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic of Serbia in Response 
to the Situation in Kosovo, Exec. Order No. 13,088, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1999), reprinted as amended in 
50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
33. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East 
Peace Process, Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). 
34. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East 
Peace Process, Exec. Order No. 13,099, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(2000). 
35. Blocking Property of UNITA and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to 
UNITA, Exec. Order No. 13,098, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 
1998); Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to UNITA, Exec. Order No. 13,069, 3 
C.F.R. 232 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 1998). 
36. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Exec. Order 12,938, 3 C.F.R. 950 
(1995), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Exec. Order No. 13,094, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
37. Brian Groom, John Willman & Richard Wolffe, Bush Targets Terrorist Funds: Threat 
to Freeze US Assets of International Financial Institutions that Fail to Co-Operate with 
Clampdown, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 25, 2001, at 1; see also Donohue, supra note 18, at 650. 
38. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 787 (2002), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(Supp. I 2002). The national emergency has since then been continued on an annual basis. See 
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twenty-seven foreign individuals who, according to the secretary of state, pose 
a risk to national security, to foreign policy, to the economy, or to U.S. 
citizens.39 It empowers the secretary of the Treasury to designate more 
Specially Designated Global Terrorists, requiring only that the designated party 
act “for or on behalf of” or is “owned or controlled by” a designated terrorist 
group.40 Anyone who or any organization that assists, sponsors, or provides 
“services to” or is “otherwise associated with” a designated terrorist group can 
themselves be listed and have their assets frozen.41 It is illegal for anyone to 
deal in the blocked assets, for any U.S. entity to try to avoid the prohibitions, or 
to make donations to relieve humanitarian suffering thereby caused.42 The 
instrument requires that foreign banks provide information to the government 
about designated terrorist groups, or risk having their assets frozen.43 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT 
Act”) amended the IEEPA to give the president the authority to block assets 
pending an investigation.44 Where an individual or organization files a 
challenge to a blocking order with the courts, an agency record containing 
classified information may “be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in 
camera.”45 Just over a year after signing EO 13224, President Bush amended it 
to enable the secretary of state to consult the secretary of Homeland Security in 
determining which entities should be listed.46 In 2005 the president again 
altered the order to clarify that the IEEPA’s humanitarian-aid exception does 
not authorize targets whose assets have been blocked to provide humanitarian 
aid to anyone, even unblocked persons, without prior authorization from the 
 
Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to 
Commit, or Support Terrorism, 72 Fed. Reg. 54205 (Sept. 20, 2007); Continuation of the National 
Emergency with Respect to Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 71 
Fed. Reg. 55725 (Sept. 21, 2006); Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to 
Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 70 Fed. Reg. 55703 (Sept. 21, 
2005); Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten 
to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 69 Fed. Reg. 56923 (Sept. 21, 2004); Continuation of the 
National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support 
Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 55189 (Sept. 18, 2003); Continuation of the National Emergency with 
Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 67 Fed. Reg. 59447 
(Sept. 19, 2002). 
39. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 787 (2002), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(Supp. I 2001); see also Donohue, supra note 18, at 650. 
40. 3 C.F.R. at 787; see also Donohue, supra note 18, at 650. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 787-88. 
43. Id. at 789; see also Donohue, supra note 18, at 650. 
44. Pub. L. 107-56, Title III (Oct 26, 2001). 
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this provision, a court has 
reviewed the classified portions of the agency record in Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified 
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005). 
46. Exec. Order No. 13,284, 3 C.F.R. 161 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 
2004). 
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Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”).47 
EO 13224 was not the only instrument Bush introduced under the IEEPA 
to address antiterrorist finance. In 2005, like Clinton before him, Bush targeted 
those involved in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(“WMDs”). Bush expanded the sanctions to apply beyond individuals 
materially contributing to the proliferation of WMDs, though, to reach those 
engaged in transactions posing a risk of materially contributing to the same.48 
The new order further prohibited financial support and made efforts to evade 
the order, to avoid the order, or to conspire to evade or avoid the order a 
violation of the IEEPA.49 
These orders allow officers of the executive branch, on the basis of secret 
evidence, to indefinitely freeze the assets of anyone suspected of contributing 
to terrorism without first obtaining a guilty verdict in any court of law. The 
procedures lack even minimal due process protections: any prior or subsequent 
hearings, any independent arbiter of fact, and any demonstration of an 
underlying crime. It is also a violation of the law to provide legal advice to any 
individual thus targeted. 
To bring suit against Treasury for being improperly listed, the target must 
ask Treasury to release his or her own funds, creating a certain conflict of 
interest. This is not just a technical point: in the case of the Al Haramain 
International Foundation in Oregon, Treasury refused to allow the group to use 
its U.S. funds to pay for attorneys. After four years, Treasury relented and said 
that the organization could hire two attorneys, while Treasury itself employed 
five to defend the government.50 
Considerable use has been made of this order: between October 2001 and 
April 2005, 743 people and 947 organizations had their assets frozen under EO 
13224.51 Such expansions in executive agency authority are not limited to 
antiterrorist finance. Regulation and surveillance of phone and internet usage 
by federal agencies, which have attracted considerably more attention, follow a 
similar pattern. 
B. Domestic Surveillance 
In the United States, the USA PATRIOT Act has become iconic. This 
 
47. Clarification of Certain Executive Orders Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions, Exec. Order No. 13,372, 3 C.F.R. 159 (2006), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 
V 2005). 
48. Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters, 
Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R. 170, 170 (2006), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 2005). 
49. Id. 
50. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 2, Al Haramain 
Islamic Found. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Civ. No. 07-1155-K1 (D. Or. 2008). 
51. See Laura K. Donohue, Anti-terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United 
States, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 303, 407 (2006). 
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legislation altered the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, introduced 
delayed-notice search warrants, and extended the application of National 
Security Letters. But in many ways, the USA PATRIOT Act is just the tip of 
the proverbial iceberg.52 
Almost unnoticed in the security-dominated atmosphere post-9/11 is that 
entirely outside USA PATRIOT Act authorities, the Department of Defense 
(“DoD”) has increasingly focused on domestic surveillance.53 Northern 
Command, created in the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, quickly 
established domestic intelligence-gathering centers in Colorado and Texas.54 
The 290 intelligence agents at these centers outnumber the number of analysts 
at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and include 
substantially more agents than the number of intelligence agents at the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).55 According to Robert W. 
Noonan, Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 
military intelligence agents can not only collect information about persons 
within the United States but they can also “receive” information “from anyone, 
anytime.”56 In his November 2001 memo, Deputy Chief of Staff Noonan wrote 
that the enemy moves in “a shadowy underworld operating globally with 
supporters and allies in many countries, including, unfortunately our own.”57 
Military intelligence would, he stated, “play a pivotal role in helping to defeat” 
the terrorist threat.58 
Given this understanding, the DoD has initiated various information-
gathering programs. For example, Operation Eagle Eyes, initially meant to 
identify suspicious activity at military installations, morphed into Threat and 
Local Observation Notice (“TALON”).59 TALON authorized the military to 
gather information domestically from “concerned citizens and military 
members regarding suspicious incidents.”60 The information in the reports is 
 
52. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 105-56 §§ 218, 213, 505. 
53. See Donohue, supra note †, at 244-48. 
54. See Walter Pincus, Pentagon Expanding Its Domestic Surveillance Activity: Fears of 
Post-9/11 Terrorism Spur Proposals for New Powers, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2005, at A6, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/26/ 
AR2005112600857_pf.html; Military: U.S. Northern Command, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/agency/dod/northcom.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008); Donohue, supra note †, at 246. 
55. See Pincus, supra note 54; Donohue, supra note †, at 246. 
56. Memorandum from Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Lieutenant Gen., GS, Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence, Dep’t of the Army on Collecting Information on U.S. Persons 1 (Nov. 5, 2001), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/uspersons.pdf; Donohue, supra note †, at 246. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See Donohue, supra note †, at 245. 
60. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def. on Collection, Reporting, 
and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DoD Within the United States to the Sec’ys of the Military 
Dep’ts et al. 1 (May 2, 2003), http://wikileaks.org/leak/us-talon-memo.pdf; Donohue, supra note 
†, at 245. 
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non-validated and “may or may not be related to an actual threat.”61 The 
program focuses on non-specific threats made against the DoD’s interests—
anything “reasonably believed to be related to terrorist activity directed against 
DoD personnel, property, and activities within the United States.”62 
What constitutes a threat to the United States? In June 2004, ten activists 
went to Halliburton’s corporate headquarters to protest the firm’s war 
profiteering.63 The protesters wore papier-mâché masks and handed out peanut-
butter-and-jelly sandwiches.64 The incident made its way into a TALON 
report.65 In April 2006, the Department of Defense released documents in 
response to a Legal Defense Network Freedom of Information Act request, 
which showed that TALON reports were filed on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transvestite student groups opposed to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy.66 Various other anti-war meetings and opposition to military recruiting 
have also made it in to TALON reports.67 
This information, along with other data, such as financial records and 
information obtained from National Security Letters, is now fed to 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (“CIFA”), an organization created by DoD 
in February 2002 to coordinate military intelligence.68 CIFA was initially 
intended as a clearinghouse for information from other agencies, but its role 
quickly expanded. Within four years, the organization had grown to incorporate 
nine directorates.69 Congressional sources suggest that in the first four years of 
its operations CIFA spent in excess of $1 billion.70 One counterintelligence 
 
61. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 60, at 1; Donohue, supra note †, at 
245. 
62. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 60, at 2; Donohue, supra note †, at 
245. 




66. Talon Report 902-03-02-05-071_full_text, Feb. 3, 2005; and Talon Report 902-21-04-
05-358_full_text.txt, Apr. 21, 2005 (on file with author); see also Servicemembers Legal Defense 
Network v. Dept. of Defense and Dept. of Justice, 471 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(verifying the existence of the TALON Reports); see also Donohue, supra note †, at 246. 
67. See Walter Pincus, Pentagon Will Review Database on U.S. Citizens: Protests Among 
Acts Labeled ‘Suspicious’, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2005, at A1. 
68. See id.; see also Dept. of Defense, Directive 5105.67 (2002), available at 
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5105_67.htm; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Is Expected to Close 
Intelligence Unit, N.Y. Times, April 2, 2008, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/02/washington/02intel.html?_r=1; Eric Lichtblau and Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands 
Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/01/14/washington/14spy.html; see also Donohue, supra note †, at 247. 
69. See Counterintelligence Field Activity Fact Sheet, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB230/03b.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
70. See Walter Pincus, Counterintelligence Officials Resign, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 2006, 
at A4 [hereinafter Pincus, Resign]; see also Pincus, supra note 54, at A6; Walter Pincus, Defense 
Facilities Pass Along Reports of Suspicious Activity, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 2005, at A12 
(discussing CIFA’s expanded remit) [hereinafter Pincus, Defense]. 
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official cited by the Washington Post estimated in August 2006 that CIFA 
employed approximately 400 full-time workers and 800 to 900 contractors.71 
The agency’s mission is to “transform” counterintelligence by “fully utilizing 
21st century tools and resources.”72 The Pentagon states that CIFA uses 
“leading edge information technologies and data harvesting,” and uses 
“commercial data”—suggesting that it contracts with private industry to collect 
information.73 
The DoD has expanded its power in other important ways. For example, 
following 9/11, the National Security Agency began monitoring telephone 
traffic,74 the Defense Intelligence Agency created a Defense 
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center to carry out “strategic 
offensive counterintelligence operations” on U.S. soil and abroad,75 and the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency began collecting information on 133 
U.S. cities, thus acquiring the capability to identify the occupants of each 
house, their nationality, and their political affiliation.76 In February 2007, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency stated that it intended to hire some 1,000 new 
analysts, engineers, acquisition specialists, and other professionals.77 
The Department of Defense is not the only beneficiary of the heavy 
weight placed on the security side of the scale. At the Department of Justice, 
new Attorney General Guidelines eliminated the wall between prosecution and 
intelligence investigations, enabling either side to initiate, operate, or expand 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act searches or surveillance operations.78 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“the Bureau”) obtained authority to enter any 
place already open to the public to collect information potentially relevant to 
criminal activity.79 No suspicion of actual criminal or terrorist activity is 
 
71. See Pincus, Resign, supra note 70, at A4. 
72. Pincus, Pentagon, supra note 54, at A6 (quoting CIFA brochure). 
73. Id. (quoting a February 2004 Pentagon budget document). 
74. Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, 
Dec. 19, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/ 12/20051219-1.html 
(confirming NSA wiretapping operation). 
75. Walter Pincus, New Unit of DISA Will Take the Offensive on Counterintelligence, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2008, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/17/AR2008081202244.html (discussing covert counterintelligence 
agency created by DIA). 
76. William M. Arkin, Mission Creep Hits Home, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2003, at M-2 
(discussing National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency plans). 
77. Carroll Publishing, Who’s News, http://www.carrollpub.com/whoentry.asp? 
entrynumber=54756&archiveType=New&last=12 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
78. See, e.g., The Attorney General (John Ashcroft), Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand 
Jury and Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Information Identifying United States Persons 
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section203.pdf; The Attorney General 
(John Ashcroft), Coordination of Information Relating to Terrorism (April 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/agdirective6.pdf; see also Donohue, supra note †, at 249. 
79. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Attorney General’s 
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigations 6 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf [hereinafter 
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required.80 Magic Lantern, a keystroke-logging program, gives the Bureau the 
ability to penetrate private computers, capturing information and automatically 
sending it back to the Bureau via the Internet.81 This program allows agents to 
break encryption by identifying pass phrases used to access information. It can 
also recreate emails and documents neither saved nor sent, as well as other 
information that was never meant to move beyond the immediate computer.82 
Various other surveillance programs emerged. The Bush administration, 
for instance, sought to recruit “millions of American truckers, letter carriers, 
train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others” as informers 
through the Terrorism Information and Prevention System (“TIPS”).83 TIPS 
would have co-opted one in every twenty-four Americans living in the largest 
ten cities to report anything perceived as “unusual or suspicious.”84 Watch lists 
proliferated.85 Of the twelve federal terrorism watch lists, perhaps the most 
well-known is what is popularly termed the “no fly list,” which is actually two 
lists: the “no fly list” and the “selectee list.”86 These lists are a subset of the 
consolidated terrorist watch list maintained by the Bureau. By July 2008, the 
number of entries on the consolidated list was estimated to have reached one 
million—although the Bureau maintained that there were only approximately 
400,000 unique individuals on the Terrorist Screening Database, suggesting 
that the remainder of the names were aliases or different spellings of the 
primary targets.87 
 
AG Terrorism Guidelines]. 
80. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1306, 1335 (2004). 
81. See Elinor Mills Abreu, FBI Confirms ‘Magic Lantern’ Project Exists, Reuters, Dec. 
12, 2001, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1212-07.htm; Alex Salkever, A Dark Side 
to the FBI’s Magic Lantern, Bus. Wk. Online, Nov. 27, 2001, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2001/nf20011127_5011.htm; Bob Sullivan, 
FBI Software Cracks Encryption Wall, MSNBC, Nov. 20, 2001, http://seclists.org/isn/2001/ 
Nov/0105.html; Warning: The FBI Knows What You’re Typing, ZDNET, Dec. 5, 2001, 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-504142.html; see also Christopher Woo & Miranda So, Note, 
The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, 15 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 521, 521 (2002); see also Donohue, supra note †, at 250. 
82. For details on keystroke logging programs, including Magic Lantern, and the extent of 
some of their capabilities, see http://www.keyloggers.com/bigbrother.html. 
83. See The Memory Hole: Website for Operation TIPS Quietly Changes, 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/policestate/tips-changes.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) 
(reprinting the original Operation TIPS July 16 and August 8, 2002 web pages); Donohue, supra 
note †, at 251-254. 
84. Donohue, supra note †, at 251; see The Memory Hole: Website for Operation TIPS 
Quietly Changes, supra note 83. 
85. See Donohue, supra note †, at 254-56. 
86. See Transportation Security Administration, Myth Buster: TSA’s Watch List is More 
than One Million People Strong, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/mythbusters/tsa_watch_list.shtm 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Transportation Security Administration, Secure Flight, 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/secure_flight.shtm (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Brock N. Meeks, 
Faces of the ‘No Fly’ List, MSNBC, Jul. 26, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8705746. 
87. Jeanne Meserve, Terrorist Watch Lists Shorter than Previously Reported, CNN, Oct. 
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Data mining operations grew in concert with these and other surveillance 
programs.88 Initiatives range from Octopus and Quantum Leap, run by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), to Insight Smart Discovery and 
Pathfinder, run by the Defense Intelligence Agency.89 The Department of 
Education operates Project Strikeback, while DHS oversees Notebook I2.90 
Perhaps the most well-known is the Total Information Awareness (“TIA”), a 
program run by the Information Awareness Office within the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Department of Defense. TIA aimed 
to combine all publicly and privately available databases worldwide in an effort 
to know what people were going to do before they did it. Even though this 
program was formally dismantled when its (former) director John Poindexter 
created a futures market to predict the next terrorist attack, military coup, or 
assassination of a foreign dictator, many of the projects created under the 
program simply continued under the auspices of other intelligence agencies.91 
The United Kingdom, modeling its practice on that of the United States, 
has followed a similar pattern of the expansion of executive authority in 
relation to antiterrorist finance and surveillance programs. Most recently, for 
instance, the London Times reported that, as part of the fight against terrorism, 
the Government intends to create a single database that will include telephone, 
email, and Internet information.92 For twelve months, the data will be available 
to the police and security services. Billions of records are subject to collection: 
in 2007, there were around 57 billion text messages sent annually and around 3 
billion emails sent per day.93 
In both countries, the expanded executive activity has serious 
implications: the state could use the information it acquires through anti-
terrorist surveillance to prevent popular dissent, to manipulate the other 
branches, or to exert social control. Yet broad executive power is an integral 
part of counterterrorist law. 
 
22, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/TRAVEL/10/22/no.fly.lists/index.html. 
88. See Donohue, supra note †, at 256-261. 
89. U.S. General Accounting Office, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a Wide Range of 
Uses, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the 
Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, app. 4, at 30 
(May 2004), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf. 
90. Id. app. 4, at 37. 
91. Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, Nat’l J., Feb. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm; Matt Kelley, Feds 
Sharpen Secret Tools for Data Mining, USA Today, July 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2006-07-19-data-mining_x.htm; Siobhan 
Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps up Data, Wall St. J. Online, Mar. 
10, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120511973377523845.html. 
92. See Richard Ford, ‘Big Brother’ Database for Phones and E-mails, Times (London), 
May 20, 2008, at 1, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ 
industry_sectors/telecoms/article3965033.ece?&EMC-Bltn=NLZF09. 
93. Id.; see also Draft Communications Data Bill, 2008/9, available at 
http://www.commonsleader.gov.uk/output/page2667.asp. 
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II 
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
It could easily be assumed that the most effective check on the growing 
strength of the executive in the United States or the United Kingdom would be 
the legislative branch.94 After all, outside of insulated Article II claims or the 
assertion of the British Royal Prerogative, it is the legislature that passes the 
statutes governing executive action. But as a practical matter, when confronting 
terrorism, the legislatures in both countries operate under severe constraints. 
Moreover, once passed, provisions meant to apply only to terrorism often are 
construed to be applicable to ordinary criminal law, where the measures take on 
a life of their own. Lawmakers’ ability to conduct oversight is also restricted. 
A. Limitations on the Legislature 
Consider first the introduction of counterterrorist law. Almost without 
exception, new provisions emerge in the wake of a major terrorist attack.95 The 
bias towards aggressive action, discussed by Professor Jack Goldsmith in his 
account of the Bush administration, is not unique to the executive.96 Legislators 
must appear responsive to the life and property interests of citizens. In the four 
months following 9/11, 97 percent of all bills, resolutions, and amendments 
proposed by Congress, totaling more than 450 measures, were related to 
terrorism.97 Britain also introduced new counterterrorist laws, despite the 
passage of permanent anti-terrorist provisions just seven months earlier.98 
New initiatives launched by officials to counter national security threats 
tend to have a sort of omnibus security character.99 The 1922-45 Special 
Powers Acts provide a good example. Between 1920 and 1922 in Northern 
Ireland—long before 9/11—more than 400 people died as a result of political 
violence.100 The 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act subsequently 
empowered the government to impose a curfew, close premises, and detain or 
intern private citizens.101 It granted extensive powers of entry, search, and 
seizure.102 The Act also gave the state the power “to take all such steps and 
issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and 
 
94. See Donohue, supra note †, at 11. 
95. Id. 
96. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency (2007); see also Holmes, supra note 2, at 
320 (asserting that Goldsmith’s conception “clashes with observable reality,” specifically in light 
of attempts by Bush Administration officials to “avoid responsibility for their actions”). 
97. Author compiled statistics, based on reviewing and reading all bills, resolutions, and 
amendments introduced in the four months following the attacks and listed by the Library of 
Congress at www.thomas.gov. See also Donohue, supra note †, at 11-12 (giving further 
statistical analysis). 
98. See, e.g., Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (“ATCSA”), 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). 
99. See generally Holmes, supra note 2, at 318-23; Donohue, supra note †, at 12. 
100. Donohue, supra note †, at 12. 
101. Id. 
102. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, § 3(4) (N. Ir.). 
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maintaining order.”103 This provision led to over one hundred new regulations, 
whose substance ranged from preventing gatherings to outlawing the wearing 
of an Easter lily, and thousands of new orders under these regulations.104 
New laws passed in the context of fears of terrorism tend to be extreme.105 
Part of the problem is that terrorist organizations are secretive: their survival 
depends upon hiding their activities and members from state scrutiny. In the 
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, a basic text for numerous terrorist 
movements, Carlos Marighella writes, “The urban guerrilla must know how to 
live among the people and must be careful not to appear strange and separated 
from ordinary city life.”106 The 1956 Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish 
Republican Army similarly emphasizes the importance of being able to move 
among the population, as does the al Qaeda Training Manual.107 The modus 
operandi of terrorist organizations is, precisely, to remain hidden—thereby 
creating greater fear among the population about the strength of the terrorist 
group and potential for terrorist violence. 
Another part of the problem is that technology and the proliferation of 
weapons ensure that the destructive capabilities of non-state actors are 
increasing. The state is concerned not just with fertilizer bombs or improvised 
explosive devices, but also with the potential use of fissile material, chemical 
weapons, or biological agents. Cyber-terrorism and efforts to sever energy 
supplies provide equally chilling scenarios. Unable to calculate the risk to the 
state, legislators err on the side of caution, as worst-case scenarios drive the 
magnitude of preventative measures. In such a heated atmosphere, authorities 
previously rejected or considered unnecessary often pass.108 For example, 
roving wire taps, excluded from the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, became incorporated into the USA PATRIOT Act.109 New 
provisions, moreover, may well go one step further than those previously 
rejected. The USA PATRIOT Act also provided for a broad range of 
information from criminal investigations to be shared with intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government.110 
In essence, at the time of an attack governments recalculate the “security 
versus freedom” framework that Professor Holmes rightly decries: the impact 
on rights is held constant, while the perceived security risk posed by terrorism 
 
103. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, § 1(1) (N. Ir.). 
104. See Donohue, supra note 4, at 12. 
105. Donohue, supra note †, at 11. 
106. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, available at 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/marighella.htm. 
107. Irish Republican Army Ireland Staff, Handbook for Volunteers of the 
Irish Republican Army: Notes on Guerrilla Warfare 2-10 (1985); Al Qaeda Training 
Manual 20-27 (recovered from a training house in Manchester and placed online by the U.S. 
Department of Justice), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
108. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note †, at 12, 123-46. 
109. USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 201, 206. 
110. USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 203(b) and (d). 
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dramatically increases and eclipses other types of security concerns (such as 
security from undue government interference or arbitrary power).111 
In this context, new antiterrorist laws often speed through legislatures 
under extraordinary procedures.112 The 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act was 
passed within a week of the Birmingham bombings.113 The Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill was sent to Westminster just two weeks after 
the Omagh bombing.114 The USA PATRIOT bill bypassed committee markup 
and went straight behind closed doors.115 The House held only one hearing on 
the USA PATRIOT bill, at which Attorney General Ashcroft served as the sole 
witness.116 At 3:45 a.m. on the morning of the vote, the final bill reached print. 
Legislators could only vote thumbs up or thumbs down with no chance for 
further amendment. 
During abbreviated timelines and heated atmospheres, formal inquiry into 
the recent disasters creates an untenable delay in legislative action.117 The irony 
is that by the time an inquiry does occur, new legislation has already been 
enacted.118 The introduction of legislation, therefore, is not the point in time 
when legislators are in the strongest position to limit the growth of executive 
power. Instead, legislators hedge; reluctant to hamstring the executive, they 
think that temporary measures will provide the executive the necessary 
flexibility while preventing the arbitrary behavior of which Professor Holmes 
disapproves. 
It is very difficult, however, to repeal temporary authorities, or “sunset 
provisions.” To do so legislators must make one of three very difficult 
demonstrations: (1) that terrorism is no longer possible, which cannot be done 
in a liberal, democratic state; (2) that terrorism will not occur as a result of 
repealing the authorities, which cannot be proven; or (3) that a level of violence 
commensurate with the last attack is somehow acceptable, which is a politically 
untenable position. As a result, legislators almost never allow temporary 
powers to lapse, nor do they repeal counterterrorist laws. New provisions thus 
become a baseline upon which further measures build to expand executive 
 
111. Donohue, supra note †, at 13. 
112. Id. 
113. See 882 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 634-943; 354 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 
(1974) 1500-70; Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (2d ed. 1992). 
114. Compare Omagh Bombing Kills 28, BBC News, Aug. 16, 1998, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/latest_news/152156.stm, with Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, c. 40 (September 4, 1998) available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980040_en_1. 
115. Interview with Representative James Sensenbrenner, Member, United States House of 
Representatives, in Palo Alto, Cal. (April 2002) (noting the absence of any committee hearings). 
116. See Jim Dempsey, Who is Watching You? The Patriot Act and Electronic 
Surveillance, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., D.C., Guest Lecture at Stanford Univ. Law Sch. (Jan. 
24, 2005). 
117. Donohue, supra note †, at 13. 
118. Id. at 14. 
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authority and promise citizens more security at the expense of civil liberties.119 
The United Kingdom followed precisely this pattern. For nearly a century, 
despite periods of almost no political violence, the state continued “temporary” 
authorities to deal with Ireland.120 The rare exceptions to the ratcheting effect—
such as the repeal of indefinite detention and the suspension of internal exile 
within the United Kingdom—arose not because of limits or controls within the 
state but because of the demands of European courts.121 The United States has 
followed a similar pattern: in 2006, Congress made fourteen of the sixteen 
temporary provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act permanent and continued the 
remaining two.122 
Thus antiterrorist legislation, although it may originally be intended to be 
temporary to allow for later expiration or repeal, tends to become permanently 
entrenched upon enactment. 
B. Transfer to Criminal Law 
It is a spiral, not a pendulum, that best characterizes counterterrorist 
law.123 And in this spiral, special interests take hold. This is where the partisan 
political agenda to which Professor Holmes refers takes on particular meaning: 
a government may use terrorist incidents to pursue agendas that reach far 
beyond the immediate threat.124 And once enacted, counterterrorist measures 
create institutional interests in maintaining the authorities, fusing the changes 
into the state structure. Moreover, counterterrorist measures often creep into the 
ordinary criminal realm. Two mechanisms here are noteworthy: first, the 
normalization of exceptional powers and the explicit transfer of such powers 
into other areas; and, second, a lack of specificity in the original 
counterterrorist statute.125 
1. Normalization 
The first mechanism that allows counterterrorist provisions to become 
mainstreamed is their application to other areas. In an attempt to prevent this, 
legislators may add language explicitly limiting the new powers to fighting 
 
119. Donohue, supra note †, at 15. 
120. Id.; see also Donohue, supra note 4. 
121. See id., supra note 4, at 259-61. 
122. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120 
Stat. 192, §§ 102-103 (2006). 
123. But see Posner, supra note 6, at 44 (“Every time civil liberties have been curtailed in 
response to a national emergency, whether real or imagined, they have been fully restored when 
the emergency passed—and in fact before it passed, often long before.”); Colm Campbell, ‘Wars 
on Terror’ and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, International Law, and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict (2005), 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 321 (2005) (arguing that the Draconian nature of 
legislation runs in cycles depending on how close states feel to the triggering emergency). 
124. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 2, at 337. 
125. See Donohue, supra note †, at 15-16. 
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terrorism. But in practice, once such measures are exercised, the idea of using 
them is no longer extraordinary. The new authorities may be powerful tools for 
law enforcement or intelligence agents—the very purpose for which they were 
introduced. As the tools move from being primarily those of intelligence agents 
to being daily tools of law enforcement, people and the courts begin to accept 
the use of such powers (and methods authorized by those powers) with less and 
less comment until finally they are simply just another tool. At that point, 
subsequent laws can explicitly transfer counterterrorist authorities—
extraordinary powers limiting individual rights that would never have been 
passed into law but for the grave threat to national security—to ordinary 
criminal law without extensive opposition or public criticism.126 
Consider anti-terrorist finance authorities in the United Kingdom.127 The 
1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (“1973 EPA”), introduced 
specifically to redress terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, provided for a 
police officer to “seize anything which he suspects is being, has been[,] or is 
intended to be used in the commission of a scheduled offence.”128 Any member 
of Her Majesty’s forces could enter any premises to detain, destroy, or move 
any property, or to “do any other act interfering with any public right or with 
any private rights of property.”129 The statute allowed the court to forfeit assets 
where an individual convicted of membership in an illegal organization 
controlled resources that benefited any of the listed banned organizations.130 
The legislation made it a criminal offense to solicit or invite support for a 
banned organization, to knowingly make any contribution to the resources of 
such an organization, or to knowingly receive any contributions from the 
same.131 Contributing to a proscribed organization was a scheduled offense: 
those accused of this crime automatically entered the Diplock Court system, 
losing their right to trial by jury.132 Other important restrictions applied, such as 
limits on bail.133 
The provisions gradually spread beyond Northern Ireland’s shores, to 
Great Britain. Unlike the 1973 EPA, the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism 
 
126. The 1954 Flags and Emblems Act came from the 1922-43 SPAs. Flags and Emblems 
(Display) Act, 1954, c. 10 (N. Ir.). 
127. Discussed in detail in Donohue, supra note †, 129-46.  For similar examples drawn 
from the United States, see id. at 151-53 (discussing the manner in which provisions transferred 
between anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist finance). 
128. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 11(3) [hereinafter 1973 
EPA] (citing authority of Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, c. 5 (N. Ir.) [hereinafter 
1922 SPA]); see also Donohue, supra note †, at 131. 
129. Id. § 17. 
130. 1973 EPA, supra note 128, § 19. 
131. Summary conviction yielded six months’ imprisonment and a £400 fine. Indictment 
resulted in up to five years’ imprisonment plus fine. See 1973 EPA, supra note 128, § 19(1). In 
1978, Westminster increased imprisonment on indictment to 10 years, but these powers otherwise 
remained largely constant through the twenty-first century. 
132. 1973 EPA, supra note 128, sched. 1(12). 
133. See 1973 EPA, supra note 128, §3 (limiting bail in the case of scheduled offences). 
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(Temporary Provisions) Act (“PTA”) did not initially allow the court to forfeit 
assets.134 The PTA did, however, make it an offense to fundraise for or 
contribute to a banned organization—but only one group graced the list: the 
Irish Republican Army (“IRA”).135 In 1976, however, the new PTA added a 
forfeiture provision that allowed the state to seize any money or other property 
controlled by an individual convicted of membership in a banned group where 
the resources were intended for use in an act furthering the cause of the IRA.136 
Similarly, the Act made it an offense to solicit contributions for a proscribed 
organization if the solicitor intended, knew, or suspected that the money would 
be funneled to terrorist activities.137 
Government powers introduced and meant to narrowly apply only to 
violence linked to the political status of Northern Ireland were soon applied to 
other terrorist threats. In 1989, for instance, the PTA severed the dependence of 
the financial provisions from a list of proscribed organizations and created a 
new, broader offense of financial contributions to acts of terrorism.138 These 
provisions applied to both Northern Ireland-related violence and acts of 
international terrorism.139 
In turn, counterterrorist provisions on both sides of the Irish sea expanded 
beyond terrorism and into the anti-drug realm, where they intensified and bled 
back into counterterrorist law. For example, the 1989 PTA expanded judicial 
forfeiture powers: whereas before the state had to prove the defendant intended 
the resources under his or her control to benefit a proscribed organization, 
beginning in 1989 the court was entitled to assume “in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary . . . that any money or property” in the defendant’s control could 
be used for terrorist ends.140 The statute only required the court to give the 
owner of the property “an opportunity to be heard.”141 In 1991, the EPA further 
expanded the government’s reach. A new section retained the proscription 
measures while adding a novel set of powers and terrorist offenses, 
incorporating all of the offenses listed in the 1989 PTA and adding two more: 
the first made it illegal to help anyone retain the proceeds of terrorist-related 
activities,142 while the second outlawed concealing or transferring the proceeds 
 
134. Donohue, supra note †, at 132. 
135. The state added the Irish National Liberation Army to the list of illegal organizations 
in 1984. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8, § 1 (Eng.). 
136. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, c. 8, § 10 (Eng.). 
137. See id.; see also Donohue, supra note †, at 132. 
138. See Donohue, supra note †, at 133. 
139. The statute was limited to acts of terrorism that constituted triable offenses within the 
United Kingdom. The legislation specifically exempted other acts of terrorism related to British 
domestic matters. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, §§ 9–13 
(Eng.). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. § 13. 
142. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, § 53. For further 
discussion, see Donohue, supra note †, at 134. 
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of terrorist-related activities.143 Violations of both would be tried before 
Diplock judges.144 
By the early 1990s, the line between counterterrorist finance and ordinary 
criminal law had all but disappeared. Part IV of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act 
(“CJA”)—a permanent, criminal statute as opposed to a temporary, 
counterterrorist law—extended confiscation orders to drug trafficking offences, 
proceeds of criminal conduct, and the financing of terrorism.145 The statute 
allowed the judiciary to confiscate assets where obtained as a direct or indirect 
result of terrorist-related activities.146 Application for reassessment of whether a 
defendant had benefited could be filed up to six years following conviction.147 
The legislation altered the standard of proof to a balance of probabilities test for 
determining whether a person benefited from terrorist-related activities, the 
value of the proceeds of those activities, and the amount of the required 
payment under a confiscation order.148 The statute lifted any protections against 
self-incrimination, requiring the defendant to provide the court with any 
information requested.149 It also created a duty for certain professions to report 
to the authorities where they knew or suspected an individual was acting in a 
prohibited manner.150 Finally, in 2002 the Proceeds of Crime Act formally 
transferred powers previously reserved to counterterrorist law and drug 
forfeiture to the broader criminal realm.151 
What had begun as Provincial measures, initiated in response to the threat 
of terrorism associated with Northern Ireland, spread to Great Britain and then 
to other forms of terrorism. From there they were applied to the anti-drug 
realm, where they intensified and transferred back into counterterrorism. 
Gradually, these measures applied more broadly—beyond drugs—to ‘ordinary’ 
criminal activity. 
Following 9/11, the steady expansion and transfer between 
counterterrorism and criminal law continued. For example, the 2001 Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act enabled the United Kingdom to confiscate 
any money whether or not a court had brought proceedings specifically linked 
to the funds.152 The statute also prevented the judiciary from playing a role in 
the freezing of assets of non-U.K. entities. Instead, where the Her Majesty’s 
 
143. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, § 54. 
144. Id. § 55. 
145. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, §§ 7, 27, 36. 
146. Id. § 37(4). 
147. See id. § 37. 
148. See id. § 36. 
149. See id. § 39. 
150. Donohue, supra note 51, at 336; see Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, §§ 48, 51. 
151. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, §§ 1, 6-13  (detailing the formation of the Assets 
Recovery Agency and the exercise of confiscation orders in England and Wales for criminal 
activity, drug-related financial crimes, and terrorist financing); Donohue, supra note 51, at 344. 
152. See ATCSA, supra note 98, c. 24, pt. I. The new provisions replaced § 24 with § 31 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000; see also Donohue, supra note †, at 142. 
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Treasury reasonably believed a non-U.K. person posed a threat to the British 
economy, British nationals, or U.K. residents, the Secretary of the Treasury 
could seize that individual’s assets.153 For the order to continue, each House of 
Parliament had to pass a resolution every twenty-eight days.154 
In each of these statutes, the normalization of authorities otherwise 
considered extraordinary enabled their transfer from counterterrorism to other 
areas of law. While the above examples are drawn from the United Kingdom, a 
similar pattern marks the progress of antiterrorist finance statutes in the United 
States.155 
2. Lack of Specificity 
The second mechanism allowing counterterrorist law to seep into the 
criminal realm derives from a lack of specificity in the original power granted. 
The USA PATRIOT Act provides a good example. The statute expanded the 
number of institutions that could be served with National Security Letters 
(NSLs).156 These administrative subpoenas quickly extended beyond the realm 
of terrorism. By 2004 the Bureau was issuing more than 56,000 NSLs per year, 
many in cases unrelated to terrorism.157 The Bureau began routinely using them 
in the preliminary investigation and “threat assessment” stage, well before a 
formal criminal investigation had even commenced.158 More than five dozen 
supervisors were authorized to sign NSLs.159 In similar fashion, use of delayed 
notice search warrants, introduced in Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
began appearing in investigations unrelated to terrorism.160 In July 2005, the 
Department of Justice reported to the House Judiciary Committee that only 12 
percent of the 153 delayed notice search warrants it received were related to 
terrorism investigations.161 These are not the only instances of powers designed 
 
153. Donohue, supra note †, at 142. 
154. ATCSA, supra note 98, pt. II. 
155. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note †, at 146-52. 
156. USA PATRIOT Act § 215. 
157. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Use 
of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 
2006, March 2006, at 110, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf. 
158. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 2005, at A01, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/05/ 
AR2005110501366.html. 
159. See USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (delegation authority); General Counsel National 
Security Law Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Letter Matters, 2, Nov. 28, 
2001, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/fbi_nsl_memo.pdf (subsequent formal 
delegation specifying individuals within the Bureau authorized to issue NSLs). 
160. America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8 (2003) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Executive Dir., 
Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.), available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/ 031118dempsey.pdf 
(referencing a Department of Justice letter of Oct. 24, 2003 to Senator Stevens detailing the use of 
§ 213 for non-terrorism-related purposes). 
161. Letter from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner to the Chairman of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary (July 12, 2005), http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/responses/ 
DONOHUE FINAL.DOC 4/30/2009  11:11:35 PM 
378 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:357 
to combat terrorism applied to non-terrorist criminal activity; according to one 
Congressional report, the USA PATRIOT Act powers were used in hundreds of 
cases that had nothing to do with terrorism.162 
Sometimes the two principal mechanisms of (1) normalization of 
exceptional powers and explicit transfer into other areas, and (2) the lack of 
specificity in the original, counter-terrorist statute, work together to further 
entrench counterterrorist law. Juryless trial in the United Kingdom provides a 
good example. 
In an effort to address the threat of intimidation posed by paramilitary 
organizations, the 1973 EPA removed jury trials and created special rules for 
single-judge courts.163 The legislation enumerated a range of crimes that were 
indicative of, albeit not limited to, terrorist activity.164 Individuals charged with 
these crimes would automatically be sent before Diplock judges.165 By the mid-
1980s, some 40 percent of cases coming before juryless courts bore no 
relationship to paramilitary (i.e., terrorist) activity.166 In concert with the lack of 
specificity in the application of the extraordinary system, the idea of using 
single-judge courts gradually became normalized. These procedures were 
retained well beyond the cessation of violence and gradually applied to other 
areas of the law.167 In 2003, the Criminal Justice Act provided for the creation 
of single-judge tribunals throughout England and Wales for cases involving 
complex fraud or where a high danger of jury tampering existed.168 
Where counterterrorist measures transfer to other areas of the law, their 
impact on rights is troubling.169 Often, counterterrorist provisions are allowed 
because of the seemingly extraordinary challenge that the government 
perceives at a particular time.170 Absent that extraordinary challenge, however, 
 
dojpatriothrgquestionresp71205.pdf. 
162. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1; FBI Abused Patriot Act Powers, Audit Finds, Guardian 
(London), Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2030542,00.html. 
163. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, c. 53, § 2 (“A trial on indictment 
of a scheduled offence shall be conducted by the court without a jury”); Provisions later 
transferred to the Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 75. 
164. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, c. 53, Schedule 4 §§ 1-4 (listing, 
e.g., common law offences of murder, manslaughter, arson, and riot). 
165. Id. § 2. 
166. Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and 
American Criminal Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1321, 1339 (2007). 
167. See U.K. Home Office, Juries in Serious Fraud Trials ¶ 3.18 (1998). 
168. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 43(2), (5) (Eng.). The Lord Chief Justice, or a 
judge nominated by him, has to agree. See id. § 43(4). In the latter instance, the prosecution 
applies to a judge of the Crown Court, which must be satisfied “that there is evidence of a real and 
present danger that jury tampering would take place” and that “notwithstanding any steps 
(including the provision of police protection) which might reasonably be taken to prevent jury 
tampering, the likelihood that it would take place would be so substantial as to make it necessary 
in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” Id. § 44(4), (5). 
169. Donohue, supra note †, at 16. 
170. Id. 
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governments seem hard-pressed to explain the grounds for allowing the erosion 
of protections such as probable cause antecedent to arrests, the presumption of 
innocence, and the right to jury trial. 
C. Oversight 
Although the legislature does not effectively limit the executive at the 
introduction of counterterrorist laws or at the renewal of such laws, the 
legislature could still help push back through its oversight function. Here the 
United Kingdom and the United States differ in important ways. 
1. The United Kingdom 
Unlike its American counterpart, the British parliamentary system is not 
built on a strict separation of powers.171 Because the Prime Minister’s political 
party generally holds a majority in the House of Commons (except in the case 
of a coalition government), the executive and legislative functions are 
intertwined.172 The system gives the ruling party both legislative and executive 
power. The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who constitute the final court of 
appeal for many judicial matters, also sit in the House of Lords, a parliamentary 
body. 
Despite the absence of a strict separation of powers, however, there are 
checks on the executive branch.173 The official Opposition forms a shadow 
government, whose members sit in the front bench of the House of Commons, 
directly opposite (and two sword lengths apart from) their counterparts.174 The 
Opposition cannot set the agenda, but it can bring substantial political pressure 
to bear.175 In the House of Lords, cross-benchers have no affiliation with either 
the Government or the Opposition and take an active role in legislative debates. 
The power of the House of Lords, while less than that of the House of 
Commons, is not inconsequential.176 In light of the recent constitutional 
reforms that power is growing, providing yet further restriction on Government 
action. 
In addition to these constitutional protections inherent in the structure of 
 
171. Id. at 17. 
172. Id.  
173. Id. 
174. Visiting Parliament, BBC News, Sept. 11, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/uk_news/politics/1491006.stm. 
175. In at least some cases, there is cross-party support for Opposition party members to 
chair Parliamentary Select Committees. But note that as a practical matter, the last two chairs of 
the Intelligence and Security Committee, both appointed by the Prime Minister, have been drawn 
from the Prime Minister’s own party. 
176. The House of Lords is weaker than the House of Commons: it can only delay public 
legislation for twelve months, and only if that public legislation originates in and is approved by 
the lower chamber; for “money bills”—legislation concerning government appropriations—it can 
only delay passage for one month. See Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 (Eng.); 
Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (Eng.). 
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government are legal and institutional checks developed precisely to counter 
the expansion of counterterrorist authority. Within agencies, detailed 
administrative systems ensure that warrant applications must first progress 
vertically through each agency and, ultimately, to the Secretary of State—a 
public official answerable to Parliament. 
Britain routinely uses independent reviewers, senior members of the 
judiciary chosen for their stature and not their political affiliation (relinquished 
upon entering judicial service), to issue reports on the operation of 
counterterrorist statutes.177 The 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act and its progeny were reviewed by one individual, and the 1974 Prevention 
of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act and its subsequent reenactments and 
amendments were reviewed by another. In 2000, the Terrorism Act, a 
permanent statute, replaced these instruments. Thereafter, formal reviews were 
annually conducted of the Terrorism Act 2000, as well as the 2001 ATCSA.178 
Parallel to formal examination of each counterterrorist statute, two 
separate reviewers audit the exercise of surveillance authorities: one 
commissioner examines the interception of communications and the other 
focuses on electronic bugs and other surveillance. These reviewers are required 
to be senior members of the judiciary, and they are selected, again, because of 
their prominence.179 British law requires the intelligence services to open their 
records to the commissioners (a.k.a. reviewers), who ask whether the 
information provided to the Home Office was accurate, whether the operations 
were conducted properly, and whether the records of the agencies are in 
order.180 The commissioners also, by custom, make recommendations for the 
agencies and suggest future changes to the laws governing the agencies.181 
When a commissioner arrives at an agency to inspect it, the directors of 
the agency are put on notice: any mistakes or misuse of authorities would be 
considered shameful and, if reported—even privately—the agency and sitting 
Government would have to act.182 As former Director of Government 
Communications Headquarters (the agency tasked with national security 
signals intelligence) Sir David Omand put it, “It is inconceivable that you 
would find the U.K. agencies going outside [the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”)] and running black operations that they were not 
prepared to tell the commissioner about. It would be more than their jobs were 
 
177. See Donohue, supra note †, at 265. 
178. Lord Carlile of Berriew, Report on the Operation in 2007 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000 and of Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006, June 2008, available at 
http://statewatch.org/news/2008/jun/uk-carlile-report-2007.pdf. See generally ATCSA, supra note 
98.   
179. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 8 (Eng.). 
180. See id. § 8(4). 
181. Interview with Lord Lloyd of Berwick, House of Lords, in London, England (June 
2007). 
182. See Donohue, supra note †, at 264. 
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worth.”183 As the commissioners inspect all agencies engaged in surveillance, 
everyone—from Government Communications Headquarters to the local egg 
inspectors—gets audited.184 
Formal inquiries supplement these annual reviews. The inquiries have a 
direct impact on the state’s counterterrorist policies, allowing the Government 
to change course without detrimental effect—indeed, the changes occur in a 
manner that actually strengthens the Government’s hand. 
In the early 1970s, for instance, as complaints of abuse during 
interrogation skyrocketed, the Government appointed a committee of three 
Privy Counsellors, headed by Lord Parker, to consider whether the procedures 
authorized for the interrogation of terrorist suspects required amendment.185 In 
a conversation echoed three decades later in the United States, the majority 
report issued by the Parker Committee questioned whether the Geneva 
Conventions applied to terrorism and probed the “wide spectrum between 
discomfort and hardship at the one end and physical and mental torture at the 
other end.”186 The problem, the committee suggested, was that “no rules or 
guidelines had been laid down to restrict the degree to which these techniques 
can properly be applied.”187 The same five techniques used following 9/11—
hooding, wall-standing, noise, sleep deprivation, and food and water 
deprivation—had, according to the majority, saved innocent lives and could be 
used “subject to proper safeguards limiting the occasion on which and the 
degree to which” they could be applied.188 That is, only where it was 
“considered vitally necessary to obtain information” should coercion be 
used.189 
Lord Gardiner, writing the minority report, took a different view. The 
procedures for coercive interrogation, known in Britain as “deep interrogation,” 
had not been written down in any document.190 Indeed, Gardiner suggested, 
they could not be written down, nor could any minister authorize the 
procedures, as such authorization would have violated domestic statutes and 
possibly international law as well.191 Placing a hood over a man’s head against 
his will and handcuffing him for trying to remove the hood would be an 
assault—both a tort and a crime—as would a number of the other interrogation 
 
183. Interview with Sir David Omand, former Dir. of U.K. Gov’t Commc’ns Headquarters 
(GCHQ), in Palo Alto, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2007); Donohue, supra note †, at 265. 
184. See sources cited supra note 183. 
185. Donohue, supra note †, at 50. For further discussion, see id. at 50-54. 
186. Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Consider Authorized Procedures for the 
Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism, Report, 1972, Cm. 4901, ¶ 9 [hereinafter Parker 
Report]. 
187. Id. ¶ 12. 
188. Id. ¶ 31. 
189. See id. ¶ 35. 
190. See id. ¶ 6. 
191. See id. ¶ 8. 
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methods.192 Because these practices violated domestic law, Gardiner did not 
need to address the questions raised by international law; he nevertheless 
considered whether they might potentially run afoul of Common Article III of 
the Geneva Conventions (incorporated into domestic U.K. law193), Article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 7 and 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.194 Gardiner further asserted that, as a 
practical matter and leaving all moral issues aside, it was not clear that deep 
interrogation actually worked. 
The same day the Parker Report was published, the Government adopted 
the minority report.195 Prime Minister Edward Heath announced: “The 
Government, having reviewed the whole matter with great care and with 
reference to any future operations, ha[s] decided that the techniques . . . will not 
be used in future as an aid to interrogation.”196 Prime Minister Heath issued a 
directive prohibiting coercive interrogation, particularly the five techniques 
listed in the majority report, and instituted mandatory medical examinations, 
comprehensive records keeping, and immediate reporting of complaints of ill 
treatment.197 
In short, the inquiry was beneficial for the government: it allowed for a 
full, independent airing of the legal, moral, and political aspects of deep 
interrogation; it subjected the current Government’s policy to outside scrutiny; 
and, as the Government adopted the minority report—essentially reversing its 
previous position—it provided an opportunity to save face. The inquiry 
legitimized the new course, ultimately strengthening the Government’s hand 
while allowing it to correct a poorly-conceived and harmful approach to 
political violence in Northern Ireland. 
There are further checks on the exercise of counterterrorist law in Britain. 
For instance, a Parliamentary Select Committee oversees expenditures, 
including how monies below the line are used by intelligence bodies, while an 
 
192. See id. ¶10; Donohue, supra note †, at 52. 
193. The Geneva Convention is incorporated into the domestic law of the United Kingdom 
via the Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas. Lord 
Parker of Waddington, Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider 
authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, March 1972, 
available at http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/parker.htm. This law serves as the equivalent in the 
United Kingdom as the UCMJ in the United States. 
194. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), Art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), Art. 7, 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1953, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 
195. Donohue, supra note †, at 54. 
196. 832 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1972) 744. 
197. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 135 (Giorgio Balladore 
Pallieri, President, citing special instructions issued to the army and RUC); see also Donohue, 
supra note †, at 54. 
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ombudsperson oversees complaints.198 Any private citizen concerned about 
being the target of state surveillance can apply to the ombudsperson for review 
of his or her case.199 
Admittedly, these oversight authorities are not perfect. The annual 
reviewers of counterterrorist law and surveillance authorities have limited time 
and resources, yet they are responsible for reviewing a great number of 
agencies and authorities. The reports tend to highlight errors, but not 
substantive violations, and portions of the report that might have sensitive 
information remain classified. Senior members of the judiciary, moreover, are 
not necessarily experts in surveillance technology. The complaints tribunals, in 
turn, only rarely uphold complaints. The ombudsperson established under the 
1989 Security Service Act, for instance, considered approximately 338 
complaints between 1989 and 1999.200 In no case did the tribunal find in favor 
of a complainant.201 In similar fashion, until the 2005-06 report, the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal never found in favor of an applicant.202 Finally, 
in February 2007, the Tribunal reported a finding in favor of two complainants 
who filed a joint application—a rather paltry showing after nearly twenty years 
in business.203 
Even recognizing the many limitations, though, the complex web of 
oversight mechanisms in the United Kingdom does offer some check on 
untrammeled executive power—protections that for the most part do not exist 
in the United States. 
2. The United States 
The paucity of oversight authority in the United States stems in part from 
the country’s original constitutional structure and the failure of the federal 
government to maintain sufficiently rigorous oversight to counter the growth of 
party politics.204 The Framers sought to provide checks neither by embedding 
government ministers in the legislature nor by placing the judiciary in the upper 
 
198. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 65 (providing for the 
creation of an Investigatory Powers Tribunal to inquire into complaints and oversee remedies for 
violation of the statute); Donohue, supra note †, at 199 (discussing implementation of the 
ombudsperson under RIPA); Donohue, supra note †, at 263-64 (detailing financial oversight in 
Parliament). 
199. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 65. 
200. See Security Service Commissioner, Annual Report ¶ 37 (1999), available at 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4779/4779-01.htm. 
201. Id. ¶ 36 (citing 1997 report: “It will be noted that in all cases neither the Tribunal nor 
myself had found in the favour of the complainant”); id. ¶39 (stating that for the 1999 figures, 
“[n]o determination has been made in favour of a complainant”). 
202. See, e.g., Commissioner, Annual Report for Interception of Communi-cations 
Act ¶ 32 (1999), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/ 
cm47/4778/4778.htm. 
203. See Intelligence Services Commissioner, Annual Report, 2005-6, H.C. 314 at 
8, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0607/hc03/0314/0314.pdf. 
204. See Donohue, supra note †, at 18-20. 
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chamber, but by separating power between the branches and offsetting those 
branches: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”205 If individual 
interests could be aligned with the constitutional rights of the office, 
government would be obliged to control itself.206 
This system did not envision contemporary party politics. Where one 
political party controls both the executive and legislative branches, it can be 
extremely difficult for Congress to perform oversight.207 The majority party in 
the House of Representatives sets the rules for how the House will conduct 
business. For years, this has meant that the majority party has chaired every 
committee and had the final word on what hearings would be held, who would 
be invited to testify, whether subpoenas would issue, and what information 
would be made public.208 
Limited by a structure that relies upon the separation of powers, the 
United States has no external judicial audit function equivalent to that which 
operates in the United Kingdom. Instead, audits are conducted by the 
intelligence agencies themselves. This check may at times be effective: it was 
the Department of Justice’s inspector general who, in accordance with statutory 
requirement, revealed that the Bureau had been misusing National Security 
Letters. The Department of Justice is not the only entity with an inspector 
general: the CIA has one, appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate. However, it would be a mistake to place too much reliance on the role 
that the inspectors general play. The breadth of their powers is limited, as are 
the powers granted to the administrative inspectors general of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security 
Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Director of 
National Intelligence.209 In these agencies, the inspectors general are appointed 
by the head of each agency and have less autonomy than, for instance, the 
CIA’s inspector general.210 
Professor Holmes’s call for transparency particularly resonates in this 
context.211 Even as executive authority is expanding, secrecy surrounds the 
activities of the executive branch: use of classification is increasing; Attorney 
General Ashcroft reversed the policy for granting Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) requests to prevent more information from entering the public 
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domain; and new FOIA exemptions protect the National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) and private industry.212 Taken together, these present strong reasons 
to be concerned.213 
III 
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
With the legislature restricted in its ability to check and monitor the 
executive, the task of pushing back falls to the judiciary.214 Yet the conscious 
aim of many counterterrorist provisions is to bypass the courts so that the 
executive retains control, thus avoiding the very branch entrusted to check the 
executive. Indefinite detention, the suspension of habeas applications, the 
protection of information through claims of executive privilege or royal 
prerogative—these and other protective devices have been recurring features of 
the counterterrorist regime in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom.215 Using a war metaphor as a way to understand the fight against 
terrorism encourages this avoidance of a judicial role by reframing the effort as 
the type of conflict traditionally controlled exclusively by the executive branch. 
Alternative courts have thus been created, including such features as weakened 
rules of evidence, the acceptance of hearsay, and the introduction of evidence 
based on coercive interrogation.216 
Where cases are retained within the ordinary court system, the judiciary 
may, on occasion, restrict the expansion of executive power. In Brandenburg v. 
Ohio the Court established protections for political speech in the United 
States,217 while in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld the Court limited executive expansion 
in the context of habeas claims.218 More recently, Boumediene v. Bush 
demonstrated the Court’s willingness to provide checks to the expansion of 
executive power.219 
On the other side of the Atlantic, A and others v. Secretary of State for the 
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Home Department led to the repeal of indefinite detention of non-citizens.220 
Only relatively recently, however, has the judicial arm of the House of Lords 
begun to push back, using the European Court of Human Rights to strengthen 
its position.221 There are limits to this approach: the European Convention 
allows states to derogate in times of national crisis.222 And the European Court 
exhibits considerable deference to member states when such claims are made. 
While the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act has special status within the 
legal system of the United Kingdom, it is not a written constitution. Judicial 
review focuses on such questions as whether subsidiary measures fall within 
the remit granted by Westminster (the procedural doctrine of ultra vires).223 
The courts consider whether officials have abused their discretion and oversee 
the application of remedial guarantees.224 For the most part, they demonstrate 
great deference to the government when issues of national security are on the 
line, thus limiting the ability of the judiciary to check the executive branch’s 
use of power.225 
In the United States, while the judicial branch is responsible for 
determining the constitutionality of federal law, its ability to do so with respect 
to counterterrorism is limited.226 Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the 
authority of the courts is restricted to cases and controversies, which has come 
to include a “standing” requirement: that is, a party must be locked in dispute 
with the other party.227 Yet it may be extremely difficult to meet the standing 
requirement when bringing a suit with regard to counterterrorism.228 How does 
one demonstrate that one is under surveillance when the very existence of the 
surveillance program is classified?229 Even when a surveillance program is 
known, such as the post-9/11 NSA telephone tapping program, it may be 
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extremely difficult to determine who is under surveillance, who has access to 
information about the program, and how the information obtained is being 
used.230 Efforts to gain access to documents proving the existence of such 
programs through FOIA can be blocked under the national security 
exception.231 While the legislature could theoretically write a law creating 
sufficient standing to bring a case, standing must still be tied to direct injury.232 
The court, moreover, acts in accordance with the principle of self-restraint: it 
avoids “unnecessary and inappropriate constitutional adjudications.”233 Such 
avoidable adjudications include “generalized grievances” that may be of 
substantial and broad public importance—the same kind of harm that may arise 
as a result of counterterrorist law.234 
Administrative law components of counterterrorism further reduce the 
rigor of scrutiny by Article III courts. EO 13224, discussed earlier, provides a 
good example.235 Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review, the court does not undertake its own fact-
finding in reviewing the decision of an agency.236 Instead, the reviewing court 
more narrowly focuses on the administrative record the agency has already 
assembled, with a presumption in favor of the validity of the administrative 
action under review.237 Where the agency’s decisions meet minimal standards 
of rationality, they are considered reasonable and must be upheld.238 An effort 
to escape inclusion on the SDGT list by Global Relief Foundation, one of the 
first entities listed under EO 13224, failed for precisely this reason.239 
The nature of counterterrorist law further marginalizes the judiciary. 
Provisions are often found at the intersections of national security and foreign 
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relations—categories firmly within the executive domain.240 As the Supreme 
Court wrote, “The war power of the national government is the power to wage 
war successfully. It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as 
substantially to affect its conduct and progress.”241 In World War II, the Court 
bowed to the executive on issues concerning not only the movement of soldiers 
and the repelling of enemy forces, but also “every phase of the national 
defense.”242 It was up to the executive, in concert with the legislature, to 
determine “the nature and extent” of the threat and to then select “the means for 
resisting it.”243 It was not for the Court to “sit in review of the wisdom” of the 
executive officials or to “substitute its judgment for theirs.”244 
Because of this relationship between the executive and the judiciary, 
perceptions of institutional competence play an important role.245 Britain’s Law 
Lords have underscored this point. Lord Nicholls wrote, “All courts are very 
much aware of the heavy burden, resting on the elected government and not the 
judiciary, to protect the security of this country and all who live here.”246 He 
continued, “All courts are acutely conscious that the government alone is able 
to evaluate and decide what counter-terrorism steps are needed and what steps 
will suffice. Courts are not equipped to make such decisions, nor are they 
charged with that responsibility.”247 In addition, the Government has better 
access to classified information and intelligence assessments than do the 
courts.248 
A similar scenario holds true in the United States.249 In 1936, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that the president is the “sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations,”250 with jurisdiction 
over national defense and war251—domains closely related to terrorism. Judge 
Richard Posner later explained that the judiciary lacks the “machinery for 
systematic study of a problem. Its staffs are small. It has to wait until it has a 
case to begin its inquiry into the facts and policy ramifications, and the pressure 
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of its caseload requires it to decide the case without being able to take the time 
to study background and circumstances and likely consequences.”252 As 
generalists, judges are not keen to question the executive branch on matters 
involving national security.253 “Judges,” Posner suggests, “aren’t supposed to 
know much about national security; at least they don’t think they are supposed 
to know much about it.”254 
Despite the limits of the American courts and their judges, legislators and 
executive officers frequently push counterterrorist measures to the limit.255 
They rationalize new strategies with an expectation—or at least the hope—that 
the judiciary will police the constitutional frontier. Thus, in 2006, Senator 
Arlen Specter, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated his 
opposition to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”) because it was 
“patently unconstitutional on its face.”256 However, when it came time to vote, 
Specter voted for the statute, saying “the court will clean it up.”257 Senator 
Specter was not alone: thirteen of the legislators similarly opposed to the 
measure ended up voting for the legislation.258 But the Court’s ability to “clean 
it up” was limited: the justices later declined to hear two habeas applications 
specifically because the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
restricted their ability to do so.259 Taking this theory to its logical extreme (and 
risking heresy), one could see Marbury v. Madison260 as having done a 
disservice by offering a false assurance of judicial oversight beyond the bounds 
of what the judiciary can actually accomplish. 
IV 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Concern about rapidly expanding executive strength in the face of national 
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security threats is not merely a product of the modern era.261 As James Madison 
reflected, “[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.”262 But what form ought such auxiliary precautions take to 
mitigate the risks of counterterrorist law?263 
Safeguards within the executive are a necessary part of any effective 
design.264 In both the United States and the United Kingdom, for instance, the 
tradition of protecting the autonomy of administrative agencies may help to 
balance against political pressure to use the bureaucracy for political advantage. 
I am skeptical, however, about the extent to which the executive branch will be 
able to limit its own expanding authority in pursuit of national security.265 
The judiciary also has a role to play in policing the boundaries of 
executive authority.266 Yet that role ought not to be over-emphasized. 
Administrative law, national security concerns, and foreign relations work 
together to weaken the courts’ position, as do substantive measures specifically 
designed to sideline the judiciary. Structural limits further restrict the courts’ 
involvement. The judiciary, in brief, is not the most important player in 
ensuring the proper introduction or exercise of counterterrorist authorities.267 
Instead, it is the legislative branch that holds the key to cabining rapidly 
expanding executive strength.268 The legislature represents the people and can 
simultaneously lead and reflect popular discourse. It can deliberate beyond the 
limits of “security or freedom,” taking account of the broader political, social, 
and economic effects of new provisions. It provides the executive with the 
authority necessary to act. It has the authority to demand that intelligence 
bodies and administrative agencies report on how new powers are used; it can 
withhold funding and authority until assured that the executive is working to 
mitigate costs associated with its power; it can subpoena members of the 
executive branch; and it can determine which information, if any, to release 
into the public domain. 
I thus conclude by highlighting four specific steps the legislature can take 
as it crafts counterterrorist law, giving the government the necessary flexibility 
without endorsing the kind of arbitrary behavior that Professor Holmes rightly 
decries.269 
The first and most important step is to do away with the old 
assumptions—foremost among them being the need to align security and 
freedom on opposite sides of a fulcrum that favors security. Indeed, a more 
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expansive view, taking into account the broader effects of counterterrorist law 
as well as the expanded executive authority, would provide for a more accurate 
picture of the consequences of new provisions. 
The second step is to develop a new protocol for responding to terrorist 
attacks by fostering a culture of restraint and to avoid the knee-jerk reaction 
that marks many of the past counterterrorist initiatives.270 The legislature can 
negotiate the relationship between representative democracy and the pressures 
of terrorism by resisting the introduction of new provisions using extraordinary 
procedures and, instead, following a terrorist attack by instituting an immediate 
inquiry into what went wrong. The determinations resulting from such an 
inquiry would allow the legislature to fix what is actually broken and to 
introduce new laws in a deliberative fashion. Emphasis on consequence 
management—and resilience—would help to assuage the demand that 
legislators act and be seen to act, even as an inquiry progresses. Rejecting 
sunset provisions and insisting in their place on obligatory reporting 
requirements and stringent oversight at the front end of a statute’s term would 
further contribute to a culture of restraint.271 And of considerable importance in 
developing a new counterterrorist protocol is maintaining a line between 
criminal law and counterterrorism—even within national security itself.272 
The third step is to heed Professor Holmes’s call for reinforcing 
transparency and accountability.273 Demanding a plausible reason for 
government action hardly undermines the ability of the executive to act. In the 
absence of plausible explanations, the government is wont to become less 
effective. To bolster transparency and accountability, the governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom should seek to strengthen the free 
availability of information and carefully assess procedures used to classify 
information. 
The fourth step is for the legislature to stop the executive from moving 
into the judicial realm or altering judicial rules.274 By so doing, the legislature 
can help to prevent further weakening of the courts. 
In sum, the “security or freedom” framework distorts the dialogue and 
risks perverting the structure of the government. While the United States and 
the United Kingdom have thus far largely responded to conventional terrorism, 
the threats of biological and nuclear terrorism loom large. How, under the 
current framing, will both countries respond to such threats? It may, in the end, 
be desirable to adopt a different government structure. But if so, the political 
discourse needs to address that change directly. Backing into it by asking what 
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is required in the short term to counter a specific threat masks the long term 
impact of these provisions. Yet that is the approach both countries have thus far 
taken in the shadow of the “security or freedom” dialogue. 
